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I. INTRODUCTION

"[TJhe right to coal consists in the right to mine it. "1
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in part, that
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation. '2
This was originally interpreted to mean that only physical dispossession by the
government triggered the duty to pay just compensation. However, the United
States Supreme Court has held that some government regulations restrict the use of
1

Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal Co., 256 Pa. 328,331 (1917) (emphasis added).

2

See U.S. CONST. amend. V.

3

See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.12 at 438 (5th ed.
1995) (citing F. BOSSELMAN ET. AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 51 (1973)).
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property to the extent that they have the same effect as physically appropriating the
property.4 This type of taking has become commonly known as a "regulatory
taking." 5 Although regulatory takings were discussed in the Supreme Court before
1922,6 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon was the case that brought the issue into
serious debate.7
In addition to Mahon, other cases involving mining regulations have
provided substantial "takings" jurisprudence.8 The more recent mining cases have
centered around the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
(SMCRA). 9 SMCRA was enacted largely to address potential harmful effects on
the environment, health, and safety.10 When Congress was drafting language for
SMCRA, environmental groups pushed unsuccessfully for language that would
essentially prohibit one type of mining commonly referred to as the "mountaintop
removal" mining method of extracting coal.11
Recently, a decision by a federal court in the Southern District of West
Virginia may well have effectively banned the mountaintop removal mining
method. 12 This is because the court interpreted the Clean Water Act and SMCRA
regulations to ban valley fills in intermittent and perennial streams.13 The use of
valley fills is essential to surface mining operations. Judge Charles Haden has
stayed his opinion until the conclusion of an appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of

See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The Supreme Court held that
government regulation must have its limits and one factor in determining if the government has overstepped
the limits is the "extent of the diminution." Id. at 413. "When it [the extent of the diminution] reaches a
certain magnitude, in most cases if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act." Id.
4

5
See Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": The Myth
and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 615
(1996).
6
See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678

(1888).
See 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also Brauneis, supra note 5, at 615; James A. McLaughlin,
MajoritarianTheft in the Regulatory State: What's a Takings Clause For?, 19 WM.& MARY ENVTL. L. &
POLICY REV 161, 164 (1995). See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
7

8

See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &

Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987).
9

See generally Hodel, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (plaintiffs argued that SMCRA provision violated the

takings clause on its face).
10

See 30 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 1328 (1994).

11

See MARK SQUILLACE,

THE STRIP MINING

HANDBOOK, A COALFIELD CITIZENS' GUIDE TO USING

THE LAW TO FIGHT BACK AGAINST THE RAVAGES OF STRIP MINING AND UNDERGROUND MINING 26 (1990).
12

See Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D. W.Va. 1999).

13

See id. at 663.
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Appeals. 14 It is precisely this type of interpretation of regulations which may, for
individual property owners, effect a taking. It is important, in this case, and the
court concedes, that for more than 20 years, state regulators have interpreted the
regulations to allow these types of valley fills.' 5 In fact, the appropriate
administrative agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding during the case to
clarify the interpretation of the regulations they developed.16 Clearly, an
"expectation right" has validly been created by such an interpretation.1 7 Even so, a
takings case for the individual whose mineral rights on the property are at issue will
not be ripe for adjudication until after the Fourth Circuit appeal. 8
This article will examine whether banning the mountaintop removal
mining method by citizen suits, judicially imposed injunctions, or government
regulation such as permit denial may be considered a taking, requiring just
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 9 The examination will begin by applying various methods
courts have used when considering takings cases. The first method focuses
primarily on "diminution of value" in the property, a concept found in both Mahon
and a more recent Supreme Court decision, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.20 The second method utilizes the "Three Factor Penn CentralTest" which
incorporates diminution of value in one of the factors but is essentially a balancing
test. 2' Finally, the article will consider whether substantive due process may be a
viable option for analyzing such a case.'
14

See Bragg v. Robertson, 190 F. R. D. 194 (S.D. W.Va. 1999).

is
16

See Bragg,72 F. Supp. 2d 642,658 (S.D. W.Va. 1999).
See id. at 653.

17

Courts have recognized property rights as including reasonable expectations. See Kaiser Aetna v.

U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979) (property consists of recognized expectanies). The Kaiser Court also
recognized that state law may create entitlements through express or implied agreements. See id. See also
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-8 (1972).
Additionally, "property interests also may be created or reinforced through uniform custom and practice."
Nixon v. U.S., 978 F.2d 1269, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing U.S. v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691,714 (1832)).
18
On April 24, 2001, the Fourth Circuit handed down its opinion in this case. The opinion reversed
District Court Judge Haden's injunction which prohibited the WVDEP from issuing mining permits that
allowed valley fills. See Bragg v. Robertson, No. 98-636-2, 2001 WL 410382, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 24, 2001).
However, the reversal was based on sovereign immunity which barred the claim from being brought in a
federal court. Id. It is unknown at this time whether the plaintiffs will reinstitute the action in a proper forum
or appeal the Fourth Circuit's ruling.
19
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S 1003, 1034 (1992).
21
See discussion infra Part III.B.
20

22

In the early 1900's substantive due process was a test which the Supreme Court used to evaluate
economic legislation. In order for legislation to pass the substantive due process test, it had to bear some
"reasonable relation to a legitimate end" and the judiciary did not pay deference to the government. NOWALK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 3, at § 11.13, at 375. In the famous case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64
(1905), the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional, a law limiting the number of hours a baker could
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23
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL MINING METHOD

The term "mountaintop removal" mining has become popularized recently
to describe the surface mining technique which reduces a mountain's original
height by subsequently constructing a flat or gently rolling terrain 4 One of the
advantages of this method is that it can remove most, if not all of a coal seam.25
Material covering the coal seam, termed "overburden," is first removed. The
overburden "swells" when removed and then exceeds what is needed to reclaim the
mining area. 26 The resulting excess 27material is often deposited into adjoining
valleys and is known as a "valley fill.
Typically, the mountaintop removal method is used in steep slope areas
where prior coal mining has occurred and under such conditions, it represents the
most economically viable means of recovering the resource.28 Mountaintop
removal operations obtain variances from the appropriate state and federal
permitting authorities in order to change the contour of the land to maximize coal
production at the site.29 This mining method is controversial for two reasons. First,
many people feel that the loss of a mountaintop damages the aesthetic quality of an
area. 30 Second, this mining method may have a deleterious effect on the
surrounding valleys and streams where the excess soil and rock is deposited.31
However,
this type of mining is an important source of the nation's energy
32
supply.
work in a week. Specifically, the Court held that government did not have a legitimate purpose in regulating
labor practices unless it related to the category of health, safety, morals, or welfare. See id.
at 53. However,
after 1937, the Court avoided the use of substantive due process as a doctrine. See NOWALK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 3, at § 11.4, at 385. Post-Lochner, economic legislation has been evaluated by the Supreme Court
by paying deference to legislators. See NOWALK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 11.4, at 385.
23
This is necessarily a brief description of the mountaintop removal mining method. For a more indepth treatment of this mining method, see SAMUEL M. CASSIDY, ELEMENTS OF PRACTICAL COAL MINING

386 (1973).
24

See A COMPLIANCE MANUAL: METHODS FOR MEETING OSM REQUIREMENTS 19-3 (SKELLY &

LOy ed., 1979).
25

See id.

26

See SQUILLACE, supra note I1,at 140.

27

See id.
at 24.

28

See Jonathan Belcher, Exploring the Latitude of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Local

Control ofSurface Mining, 17 WM.& MARY J. ENVTL. L. 165, n. 13 (1993).
29

See A COMPLIANCE MANUAL: METHODS FOR MEETING OSM REQUIREMENTS, 19-3 (SKELLY &

Loyed., 1979).
30
See SQUILLACE, supra note 11, at 26.
31

See id.
at 26.

32

See WEST VIRGINIA COAL ASSOCIATION, COAL FACTS 1998 30 (1998). Coal represented 57% of

the electricity produced in the United in 1997. See id. Additionally, 61% of the total coal production 1997,
was produced by surface mining. See id. at 3.
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As stated earlier, the mountaintop mining method, because it is a form of
surface mining, is regulated by SMCRA. SMCRA sets forth, among other things, a
permitting process requiring compliance with specific reclamation and
environmental performance standards. 33 In lieu of the federal government enforcing
SMCRA and its regulations in each state, a state may develop its own surface
mining regulatory program. 34 If a state's program is as stringent as the federal
program under SMCRA, that state can be granted primacy.35 Subsequently, that
state's own regulatory program will be enforced in place of SMCRA.3 West
Virginia's program was the first to be recognized for primacy on January 21,
1981. Surface mining is important to the coal industry in West Virginia; this
method represented 31 percent of the total coal mined in West Virginia in 1997 .3

III. TAKINGS LAW AND MINING
A.

The "Diminutionin Value" Theory
1.

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon

The Mahon case considered whether private landowners must be
compensated for a regulatory taking when actual physical invasion of their land
does not occur yet the uses of their land are severely limited.3 9 In Mahon, the
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute called the Kohler Act was challenged."
This statute prohibited mining coal when subsidence would occur, with certain
exceptions. 41 The Mahons possessed a deed which conveyed the surface rights but
which reserved the right to remove underground coal. 2 Additionally, the deed
contained a clause, whereby the Mahons waived "all claim for damages that may
arise from mining out the coal. 43 After the Kohler Act was promulgated on May
33

See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1251 to 1279 (1994).

34

See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1994).

35

See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1994).

36

See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1994).

37

See 30 C.F.R. § 948.10 (2000).

38

See WEST VIRGINIA COAL AsSOCIATION, supra note 31, at3.

39

See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922).

40

See id. at 412.

41

See Act of May 27, 1921 (Kohler Act), 1921 Pa. Laws 445. The prohibition applied when the

miner did not own the surface rights and when certain supported structures were involved, such as houses,

schools, and hospitals. See id.
42
See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
43

Id.
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27, 1927, the Mahons brought suit claiming that Pennsylvania Coal Company's
right to mine under their property was "taken away." 44 Essentially, the plaintiffs
asserted that even though the right to mine coal was reserved in the deed of
conveyance where they built their house, the Kohler Act served to override the
property and contract right to remove the coal. 4 s
The Court was asked to consider whether forbidding the mining of coal
was violative of Pennsylvania Coal Company's Fifth Amendment rights because it
effected a taking without just compensation. 46 The Supreme Court's majority
opinion, written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, stated that government "hardly
could go on" if it had to pay every time a regulation diminished property value.47
However, this statement is qualified by his famous declaration that "if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 48 Holmes did not specifically define,
in the opinion, what "too far" means. 49 He did state, however, that state police
powers had to be limited in some way "or the contract and due process clauses are
gone." 50 As a way of offering an example of how to consider the limitations,
Holmes writes about "the extent of the diminution," thereby creating the
diminution in value theory as applied to cases.51 Some scholars have dismissed this
as being a ridiculous proposition. 2 Nevertheless, Holmes created a test for takings
cases which simply requires that one must consider the individual facts of the case
when determining if a regulatory taking that triggers the just compensation
requirement has occurred.53 This essentially created a much-maligned case-by-case
basis test.54 Yet, it seems logical that a private property owner's constitutionally
protected property rights be considered in the balance. These rights are no less
important than the constitutionally provided state police powers.

44

See id.

45

See id at 412-3.

46

See id. at 412.

47

Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.

Id. at 413. Indeed, Holmes stated that "[t]o make it commercially impracticable to mine certain
coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." See id.at
414.
48

See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 63. See also Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the
Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984).
50
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
49

51

Id.See generally Rose, supra note 49, at 566-69 (exploring the diminution in value test).

52

See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 164. See also Robert Brauneis, supra note 5, at 615 (author

characterizes Holmes's opinion as "mysterious"); Rose, supra note 48, at 566 (identifying the diminution in
value test as "troubling in its ambiguity").
See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. Perhaps this is consistent with the pragmatism that is implicit in
Holmes' remark that "[the Constitution] is an experiment, as all life is an experiment." Abrams v. U.S., 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1910) (possibly implying that we take each case, like we take each day, one at a time).

53

5

See sources cited supranote 51.
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2.

Hodel v. VirginiaSurface Mining andReclamationAss 'n

Importantly, in a later case, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n, the Court returned to its discussion about the diminution in
value theory.-3 The plaintiffs argued and the lower court agreed, that the SMCRA
provision establishing standards for mining operations on steep slopes m violated
the takings clause because it could not be met.5 7 The Supreme Court held that this
was a facial challenge 8 and afforded the challenge a low level of scrutiny which
the statute passed. 9
Of significance, however, was the Court's dictum that it would apply a
higher scrutiny when specific landowners could proffer adverse economic impacts
and property devaluation to their individual lands.60 Justice Powell, in his
concurring opinion in Hodel, sheds light on the subject of when the Court may find
that a taking has occurred. 61 Bearing in mind that Virginia and West Virginia have
similar topography, Justice Powell's comments have great relevance to our state.
Powell notes that coal is Virginia's most valuable natural resource. 62 Because the
land is "marked by steep mountain slopes, sharp ridges, massive outcrops of rock,
and narrow valleys," the alternative uses of land are "severely" limited. 3 The value
of land, Powell states, "lies, in most instances, solely in its coal."' He further
writes that "[a] number of the [Surface Mining Control and Reclamation] Act's
provisions appear to have been written with little comprehension of its potential
effect on this rugged area." 65 These statements, when considered with the
aforementioned dictum in the majority opinion, seem to indicate that as applied, the
steep slope requirements could effect a taking if an individual mining permit is
denied. The Hodel opinion marked a definite return to Holmes' diminution in value
55

See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).

5

See 30 U.S.C. § 1265 (1994).

57

See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 293 (citing the district court case, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and

Reclamation Ass'n, 483 F. Supp. 425, 437 (W.D. Va. 1979), where the lower court held that in most cases, it
would be "economically and physically" impossible to mine the lands in compliance with the stated
provisions of SMCRA).
5

See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295 ("[The only issue properly before ... this Court, is whether the 'mere
enactment' of the Surface Mining Act constitutes a taking.").
59

6

See id.

See id. at 296, n. 40. "[Tihis holding does not preclude appellees or other coal mine operators from

attempting to show that as applied to particular parcels of land, the Act and the Secretary's regulations effect

a taking." Id. at 296. Additionally, the court held that if such a case is brought, there are several factors
which much be considered. See id.
61
See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 306.
62

See id.

63

See id.

64

See id.

6

See id. at 307.
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theory and signaled a willingness in the Court to apply the Fifth Amendment's
Taking Clause to regulations.
3.

Keystone Coal v. DeBenedictis

In 1987, the Supreme Court decided Keystone Coal v. DeBenedictis.
Although the facts were stunningly similar to the facts in Mahon, the challenged
Subsidence Act was found to not effect a takings and was, therefore,
constitutional.67 This was because in part, the Court stated, the company could still
mine 50 percent of the coal on the property.68 However, in this case and others,
prohibiting surface mining outright may "extinguish the whole coal right," thereby
effecting a taking, regardless of the fact that some coal will be accessible by other
methods.69
In Keystone, the dissent argued that 27 million tons of coal must be left in
place due to the Subsidence Act. 70 This coal is separate from the 50 percent allowed
to be removed. 1 Since this coal cannot be utilized in any way, the regulation
should be considered a taking requiring just compensation. 72 "[T]he right to coal
consists in the right to mine it."' 73 If the right to mine the coal is taken away, all
viable uses of the coal are taken away.74 This leads into a discussion of a recently
decided Supreme Court case, Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council.*

480 U.S. 470 (1987). The vote was 5-4 with Justices Stevens, Brennan, White, Marshall,
and
Blackmun in the majority. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent and was joined by Justices Powell,
O'Connor, and Scalia.
67
See Keystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987). The Pennsylvania
66

Subsidence Act required that a certain amount of coal (generally 50%) be left in place in order to support
certain dwellings on the surface such as houses, hospitals, and schools. See id. at 476. The plaintiffs in this
case were an association of coal mine operators and corporations which engaged in underground mining. See
id.at 478. The complaint asserted that the section of the Act mandating that 50% of the coal be left in place
constituted a taking of private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 479.
68
See id. at 485.
69

See Paul Upsons, Valid Existing Rights Under the SMCRA and Takings Implications, 22 COLO.

LAW. 2405, 2406 (1993).
See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 515 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

70
71

See id. at 517.

72

See id. at 518.

73

See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal Co., 256 Pa. 328, 331

(1917)).
74
See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 518. The dissent, in discussing the property interest in the coal, asserts
that "[flrom the relevant perspective-that of the property owners-this interest has been destroyed every bit as
much as if the government had proceeded to mine the coal for its own use." See id.

75

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncil

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council was decided 70 years after the
controversial Mahon opinion was published.76 This case follows the same law set
forth in Mahon, that when government regulation goes too far, it is a taking
requiring just compensation. 7 Yet it has turned out to be just as controversial as
Mahon'7 8 The plaintiff, David Lucas, a real estate developer, bought property on
the beachfront of an island in South Carolina with the intention of building homes
on the lots.7 9 Subsequently, South Carolina passed the Beachfront Management

Act, preventing Lucas from building any occupiable dwellings.80 The Supreme
Court held that based on the trial court's findings, the plaintiff had lost all
"economically viable" use of the property. 8' Based on this, South Carolina would
be required to pay the plaintiff just compensation. 82 However, the Court limited its
ruling by remanding the case for determining whether the plaintiff could have built
the houses under state nuisance and property law.83 This case is important because
it stands for the proposition that a future use of property can be "taken." Therefore,
it is significant to the coal industry because the most essential property right for
that industry is the future right to remove the mineral.
B.

The "Three FactorPenn Central Test"
1.

Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City ofNew York

Although not a mining case, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York" is an important case in the establishment of takings doctrine. The plaintiff
owned Grand Central terminal, which had been designated a "landmark" under
New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law.85 Penn Central wanted to construct
a multi-story office building above the Grand Central terminal.8 8 A Commission
was created under the Landmarks Law and was charged with the responsibility of
76

See id.

77

See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 165 (stating that the Supreme Court, through the Lucas opinion

78

applied the diminution in value test for the first time).
79
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008.
so
81

See id. at 1008-9.
See id. at 1020.

82

See Id. at 1027.

83

See id. at 1031.

84

438 U.S. 104 (1978).
See id. at 104.

85
86

See id.
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determining whether such changes could be made to landmarks.8 7 In this case, the
Commission rejected Penn Central's plan because it would be "destructive of the
Terminal's historic and aesthetic features."88 Penn Central promptly brought suit
claiming that the decision violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution by taking property without just compensation and
without the due process of law.8 9 The United States Supreme Court concluded that
a takings had not occurred. 90 In its analysis, the Court noted and applied the three
important factors which it had historically used in making previous decisions in
takings cases. 91 The three factors include "an analysis of the economic impact,
effect of reasonable investment-backed expectations, and character of the
government action. 92 It is these three
factors which future courts would deem the
93
"Three Factor Penn CentralTest.,
2.

FloridaRock Indus., Inc. v. U.S.

The latest mining case on point is FloridaRock Indus., Inc. v. U.S. 94 which
was filed in the United States Court of Claims. The United States Corps of
Engineers had denied Florida Rock a permit that would have allowed it to mine
limestone on its property. 95 The denial effected a taking under the Fifth
Amendment requiring just compensation.9 In its analysis, the court applied the
"Three Factor Penn CentralTest" to the facts of the case.97
In considering economic impact, the court looked at the property's value
before and after permit denial, effectively calculating a "diminution in value. 98
The court actually calculated that Florida Rock suffered a 73.1 percent diminution
in value of its land. 99 "Recoupment of investment" was also explored in this

87

See id.

88

Id.

89
90

See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 104.
See id. at 138.

91

See id. at 124.

92

Id. (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)).

See Naegle Outdoor Adver. v. City of Durham, 803 F. Supp. 1068, 1073, n. 3 (M.D.N.C. 1992);
and McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 F. Supp. 504,607 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
93

94

45 Fed. CI. 21 (1999).

95

See id. at 22.

9

See id. at 23.

97

See id. at 32.

98

See id. at 33.

99

See FloridaRock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 43.
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factor's consideration.leo The court considered whether Florida Rock could recover
101 It
any of the money it had spent in preparation for mining the property.
concluded that half of the investment could be recovered by making use of the
property's only value left after prohibiting mining it - "resale as a speculative
investment."10 2 Based on the evidence proffered by both sides, the court
0 3 found that
impact."'
economic
"severe
a
Rock
Florida
caused
denial of the permit
In considering the second factor of the Penn Centraltest, interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, the court examined whether the
disallowed use was the primary expectation for the property.'04 This consideration
was obvious, Florida Rock had discovered the limestone in 1972 and bought the
property specifically to mine the 100 million tons of rock underneath the surface. 5
Florida Rock had also prepared market studies at the time and determined that there
was indeed a strong market for the stone and would be for several years." °
Accordingly, using Penn Central language, the court found that the " 'primary
expectation concerning the use of the parcel' was frustrated." 0"
Lastly, the court considered the "character of the government action."10 8
The court found it significant that "[r]ock mining is widespread in this region of
Florida."' 1 9 Also, the mining of rock was "perfectly permissible" until permit denial
by the Corps." 0 It was within the government's powers to create a policy that
would benefit the general public by prohibiting some wetlands development."'
However, it is for the judicial branch to determine whether
' 12 such an action
constitutes a taking "as if [the property] had been condemned." "

100

Id. at 38.

101

See id.

102

In finding the property's value lying in the "speculative market," the court was recognizing the

fact that someone may purchase the land with the expectation that the wetlands regulations may one day be
"eased," thereby allowing mining on the property. FloridaRock; 45 Fed. Cl. at 34.
Id. at38.
103
104

See id (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978)). The

Court in Penn Centralstated that the New York law allowed the continued use of the terminal as it had been

used for 65 years. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 136 (1978). "So the law does not interfere with what must

be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel." Id.
See FloridaRoc 45 Fed. Cl. at 39.
105

106

See id.

107

Id.

Ica

Id.at40.

109

Id.

110

FloridaRock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 40.

III

See id. at 23.

112

Id.
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Substantive Due Process

An alternative method for analyzing our hypothetical is substantive due
process. 13 The due process clause may appear to merely guarantee certain
procedures 14 but it has long been held to serve as a limitation on the substantive
power of legislatures to regulate. 115 Traditionally, under substantive due process, a
court would review a regulation to determine if it was a valid exercise of the state
police power.1 16 Substantive due process was later viewed as a rational basis test by

which regulations are rarely, if ever, struck down. 1 7 Using this test, a regulation
will be found constitutional if any rationale is offered to suggest that public interest
is being promoted by the action."1 " This, in a sense, is no test at all." 9
Recently, however, the Supreme Court defined substantive due process as
a reasonableness test and rejected the rational basis test in TXO ProductionCorp. v.
Alliance Resources Co. 120 This reasonableness test takes into account "the extent of
the burden on the regulated party and requires that the public interest promoted be
proportionate to the burden.' 12' This reference to a reasonableness test is a return to
113

See discussion supra note 22. Although Lochner has been treated as an anathema in the Supreme

Court, some scholars claim that there has been an ongoing use of it even though the court has refused to use
the words "substantive due process." See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 204. Lately, however, the stigma
attached to the use of substantive due process in cases involving economic regulation seems to be fading.
Members of the court have been using the term and applying the test recently. For example, in Moore v. East
Cleveland, Justice Powell stated the following: "Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field
for this Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection of certain substantive
liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions of The Bill of Rights. As the history of the
Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concem lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become
the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court. That history counsels caution
and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment ....
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,495 (1977)
(emphasis added). Even more recently, the court applied substantive due process in determining whether
punitive damages were excessive and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." See BMW of N. America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1999). The court required that punitive "damages awarded must be
reasonably necessary to vindicate the State's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence." See id.
(emphasis added).
114
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
115

See Lochner v. City of New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).

116

See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (the police power exercise must fit into the category of health, safety,

morals, or welfare and be reasonably related to the exercise of the police power).
117
See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1948).
118

See id.

119

See Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal,51 ALA. L.

R. 977, 1024 (2000). Professor Eagle states that the rational basis test should be discarded, and in its place, a
new test, "meaningful scrutiny," should be used. "Meaningful scrutiny" stands for the proposition used by
the U.S. Supreme Court in a context other than takings that "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Id. at 1025 (quoting City
of Boerne v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). See also McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 206 (descrbing the
rational basis test as "utterly toothless").
120
See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
121

See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 164 (citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
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the same language of a 1928 case that struck down a zoning ordinance.' 22 In
Nectow v. Cambridge, the property owner claimed that a zoning ordinance had
deprived him of property without due process of law.123 The Court held that "[t]he
governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of
the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited. 1 24 Although
the Court, in Nectow, stated that it would pay deference
25 to the legislative judgment,
it also mentioned a "balancing" of harm and benefit.
The problem with substantive due process whether using the rational basis
or reasonableness test is that it pays some deference to the regulation and merely
pays lip service to the property owner's burden. It is thought that this
reasonableness test "will catch an occasional case of regulatory carelessness. 1 2 6
However, it is a fact that since 1937, the Supreme Court has not struck down any
economic regulations for violating substantive due process. 27
Even so, there is evidence that this trend may be changing. In the Supreme
Court's latest regulatory takings case, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of
Monterey, Ltd.,26 it upheld jury instructions which allowed the jury to consider
whether a city's decision to deny a permit for development was reasonably related
to the city's justifications for the denial. 29 Although Justice Kennedy was careful
to narrow the opinion, the decision can be interpreted to mean that the Court
condones a much less deferential judicial review of land use decisions than does the
rational basis test.130 The resolution of Del Monte Dunes may, therefore, have wide
implications because substantive due process, as historically practiced since 1937,
has not given courts broad discretion when reviewing government action.' 3 ' It now
appears as if we are seeing the return of Nectow, and, although some deference will
509 U.S. 443,458 (1993)).
122

See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).

123

See id at 185.

124

Id.at 188.

125

See id.

126

McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 202.

127

See GERALD GUNTHER AND KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 483 (1997).

See

generally U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding a federal prohibition of the
interstate shipment of "filled milk"); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525 (1949) (sustaining "right to work" laws); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(upholding an Oklahoma statute preventing opticians from fitting eyeglass lenses into frames without a

prescription).
128
526 U.S. 687 (1999).
129

See id. at 706 (1999).

130

See id. Justice Kennedy states that the jury instructions were limited to whether "in light of all the

history and the context of the case, the city's particular decision to deny Del Monte Dunes' final development
proposal was reasonably related to the city's proffered justifications." Id.Therefore, Justice Kennedy writes,
a rule has not been adopted which allows a "wholesale interference by judge or jury with municipal land-use
policies, laws, or routine regulatory decisions." Id.
131

See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 127, at 483.
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be paid to legislative action, the Court seems willing to132review such action with a
higher level scrutiny, and may perform a balancing test.
IV. POTENTIAL EFFECT OF DENYING A COMPANY A MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL
MINING PERMIT

The following sections will consider the outcomes of a hypothetical case
involving a property owner coal company holding the rights to mine coal on a tract
of land either as property owner or lessee, that has been denied an individual
mountaintop mining method permit in southern West Virginia. This denial can
occur because of a decision by an administrative agency, judicial decision, or by
the interpretation of a legislative rule.
A.

Determination Using a Mahon/LucasAnalysis

It is evident that a court, in considering such a case, could use the
rationales from Mahon and Lucas in making a takings determination. A company
challenging such a permit denial has the potential to be successful by arguing its
position from the perspective of both cases. Mahon and Lucas, read together,
conclude that a regulation has gone "too far" when it deprives a property owner of
all "economically viable" uses of the property; thus, a compensable taking will
have occurred.' 33
A company will be more successful if certain things are true about the
property. First, mountaintop removal mining will probably have to be the only
possible mining method to recover the coal seam. 3 4 Even if substantially less coal
can be extracted using other methods, a court probably will not find a compensable
taking. This is because Holmes' "too far" language seems to have been interpreted
in Lucas to mean that a loss in economic value very close to 100 percent is the only
time a taking can occur. 135 Nevertheless, it is possible that in the future, the United
States Supreme Court will take the position that a loss of less than 100 percent can
still require just compensation.' 36 Justice Scalia wrote the Lucas opinion and stated
in a footnote that it is "unclear" whether a person will be found to have been
deprived of all economically beneficial use of a burdened portion of the land, when,
for example, 90 percent must be left undeveloped because of a regulation. 3 7 On the
132

See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 706.

See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020 (1992); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922).
134
The word "possible" refers both to the supposition that mountaintop removal mining may
physically be the only method available and that this may be the only method economically feasible due to
market considerations.
135
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016, n. 7.
133

136

See id.

137

See id.("When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its
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other hand, Justice Scalia considers that this type of circumstance may be treated as
a mere diminution in value for the entire tract, and thus, not qualify as a taking. 138
Justice Scalia has left open this question for another case.
By applying the above-mentioned dictum from Lucas to our hypothetical,
the result might be something like the following. First, it is necessary to make some
assumptions. The coal company/property owner is denied a permit to use the
mountaintop removal mining method on its property. Additionally, the company
has proof that 95 percent of the coal seam could have been extracted using this
method. Underground mining is the second option and it is estimated that 30
percent of the seam will not be extracted due to the limitations inherent in this
method. The company can argue that, for 30 percent of the property, a takings has
occurred because all economically viable uses of that portion of the property have
been denied.
The analysis is easier if any other means of mining is impossible. This
would preclude the company from any type of mining on the property. As the
concurrence by Justice Powell noted in Hodel, the terrain on these types of
properties is such that, no other economically viable use can be found. 139 The steep
slopes and rocky soils usually preclude timbering, at least in a manner that is
economically viable. 140 Additionally, farming and housing developments are
generally out of the question. 141 Uses such as charging for hunting permits will
probably not be found "viable," thus a court is more likely to find that a takings has
occurred. 42
B.

Determination Using the Three FactorPenn Central Test

A company suffering a mountaintop removal mining permit denial is more
likely to receive just compensation for a takings under this test. Each of the three
factors is considered in turn.
First, considering economic impact, determining value before and after
permit denial will be similar to the FloridaRock analysis and it should be easy to

natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been
deprived of all economically beneficial use ofthe burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner
has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole."). See also Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. U.S.,
45 Fed. Cl. 21, 32 (1999) (where the court seems to have taken Justice Scalia's dictum at face value by
holding that "[tihe notion that the government can take two thirds of your property and not compensate you
but must compensate you if it takes 100% has a ring of irrationality, if not unfairness, about it").
138
See id.
See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 306 (1981) (Powell,
J.,
concurring).
139

140

Id.

141

Id.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 (1992) (Justice Blackmun, in
his dissent, noted that Lucas could still use his property for swimming and camping, yet the Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's finding that the property was valueless).
142
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calculate a diminution in value.143 In this analysis, the fact that another mining
method is permitted may not preclude a compensable taking as it would in the
MahonLucas determination. However, it will be a question of degree. For instance,
if underground mining is possible on-site, there is no question that less coal can be
extracted in this manner than via mountaintop removal mining where it is possible
to mine the entire seam. 144 But if the diminution in the amount of coal that is
unmineable by underground mining represents only 20 percent of the whole, this is
certainly less significant than if 50 percent or more will remain in the ground.
There is no magic number, the diminution in value is simply one of the
considerations. Even so, severe economic impact will more likely be found when
other mining methods are proven infeasible.
That the company has extensive investment-backed expectations to mine
the property will probably be easily proved in our theoretical case. The company
will have extensive documentation proving money spent in preparation to mine the
coal including geology reports, and engineering and consulting services. It will be
clear that the "primary expectation concerning use of the property is frustrated" by
banning the planned mining method. Again, as with the first factor, the extent of
this frustration depends on the feasibility of other mining methods on the property
in question.
Lastly, in considering the character of the government action, the court
will most likely find that it is within the government's police powers to create a
policy prohibiting mountaintop removal mining in some cases. There is definitely
some benefit conferred on the general public when any property is left
undeveloped; particularly in the case of this hypothetical, where aesthetics play an
important role. However, when the court considers the same issues it did in Florida
Rock, it will be evident that one property owner via permit denial is shouldering the
responsibility for the benefit. 145 This is precisely what the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause is meant to prohibit. 146 Similar to the facts in Florida Rock, the
court will find other such mining operations in southern West Virginia which are
permitted to occur. 147 Also, the permit denial will represent the government
148
preventing what the property owner has a right to do under the common law.

143
See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 33-7 (1999) (plaintiffs and the government
both offered valuation experts).
144
See A COMPLIANCE MANUAL: METHODS FOR MEETING OSM REQUIREMENTS 19-3 (SKELLY &

LOy ed., 1979).
145
See FloridaRock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 23 (stating that "[c]ompensation is due when this test indicates
that plaintiff was singled out to bear a burden which ought to be paid for by society as a whole").
146
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
147

See Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 40. The Court found it notable that the disallowed use was

widespread in the areas surrounding plaintiffs property. See id.
148
See id. at 24. See also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 ("The fact that a particular use has long been
engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack on any common-law prohibition ....
So
also does the fact that other landowners, similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use denied to the
claimant.").
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C.

DeterminationUsing Substantive Due Process

By applying the traditional substantive due process, or rational basis test,
to our hypothetical, it is obvious that any regulation banning the mountaintop
removal mining method, even on an individual basis, will not be found to be
unconstitutional. This is because the rational basis test pays maximum deference to
legislative decisions. 49
However, there may be a different result if a court applies the newest form
of substantive due process as it allowed in Del Monte Dunes. Under this analysis,
court may apply a slightly higher level of scrutiny than the rational basis test. A
judge or jury will consider whether the decision to deny the permit is "reasonably
related" to a legitimate public purpose. Undoubtedly, the proffered justification for
permit denial will include the benefits of leaving the land in its natural topographic
state and environmental concerns. Although the reasons for permit denial will
likely be found to be "legitimate public interests," the factfinder must consider
whether this "particular decision" to deny the permit, in our hypothetical, is
reasonably related to the5 public interests.' This inquiry does not promote
"wholesale interference"' ' with land-use decisions, yet it allows for an
examination of "the methods by which agencies negotiate with landowners and
defer decisions."15 2
Additionally, unlike the rational basis test, a judge or jury may consider the
53
surrounding circumstances pertaining to the permit denial in our hypothetical.
Therefore, the fact that the state agency has approved numerous permits similar to
the one denied will be important. Also, the fact that the coal company/property
owner has spent time and large sums of money in anticipation of mining the
property via the mountaintop removal mining method, as previously allowed under
other permits, is pertinent.
In summary, the "reasonableness" test allows for a balancing of interests
similar to the "Three Factor Penn Central Test." Because a factfinder will be
permitted to consider the burden on the property owner and surrounding
circumstances, the plaintiff in our hypothetical is more likely to win a takings
challenge than with the rational basis test.

149

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1143 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Tribe
states that for economic forms of regulation, the minimum rationality test should "continue to govern under
the traditional deferential 'conceivable basis' test ... as a means of upholding all but the most brazenly and
blatantly irrationalgovernmentalmeasures." Id. at 1445-6 (emphasis added).
150

See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 706.

151

See id.

152

Eagle, supra note 119, at 1039.

153

See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 706 (the jury was "not asked to evaluate the city's decision in

isolation but rather in context") (emphasis added).
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V. CONCLUSION

The courts have left open the question for the time being, about whether
banning a specific type of mining method could effect a taking for an individual
mine. After Hodel and Lucas, it is evident that in certain instances a court will find
a taking requiring just compensation. This finding will be more probable in a state
such as West Virginia where certain lands are likely to have no other economically
viable use and where mountaintop removal mining may be the only mining method
feasible.
Takings cases will continue to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
However, the emergence of identifiable factors which a court will consider give a
clearer guide to property owners in determining the viability of a takings claim in
light of government regulation. The "Three Factor Penn Central Test" seems to be
the best method of resolving these types of land use regulation cases because the
judiciary is not required to pay deference to either side. Some scholars may argue
that the Penn Central test is merely a guise for the substantive due process
reasonableness test. Although the tests are similar, by using the three specific
factors in the Penn Central test, it will be easier for a court or jury to balance the
benefits and harm.
In summary, there is a strong possibility, with the right set of facts, that a
taking requiring just compensation will be found when a specific mining method is
banned. This is especially true given the dynamics of a changing United States
Supreme Court.1 54 This is a fair result. Individual property owners should not alone
be forced to bear the cost of public policy, no matter how legitimate the interest.155
Stephanie Rend Timmermeyer"

154

See Brauneis, supra note 5, at 615 (noting that before 1986, on only four occasions in its two-

hundred-year history did the Supreme Court find compensable regulatory takings, yet the Rehnquist Court
found four in its first 10 years).
155

The Supreme Court supported this view in its statement that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee

that property shall not be taken without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole." Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
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